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Courts throughout the nation have held that an incarcerated
person1 has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conver-
sations.2 This idea originated in dicta of the United States
Supreme Court in Lanza v. New York 3 and has been the foun-
dation upon which many courts have relied in denying prison-
ers Fourth Amendment protections.4
But current case law leaves the following question unan-
swered: should the idea that there can be no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in prison be a talismanic solution to all
Fourth Amendment questions regarding electronic surveil-
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. Inmates who have been imprisoned after lawful conviction have a distinct sta-
tus from that of suspects and pretrial detainees; that is, suspects and detainees are
presumed innocent. See Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972); Norris v. Frame,
585 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978). But, for the purposes of this note, the term "prisoner"
and "inmate" will embrace suspects, pretrial detainees and incarcerated convicts.
2. E.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Williams v. Nelson, 457 F.2d 376
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 916 (1973); Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972); People v. Estrada, 93
Cal. App. 3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1979); People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 538 P.2d 1, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (1974); Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1975); State v. Lucero, 96 N.M.
126, 628 P.2d 696 (1981); State v. Fischer, 270 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1978).
3. 370 U.S. 139 (1962). See also Beaney, The Constitutional Right To Privacy in the
Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 212.
4. The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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lance' in custodial situations?
This note discusses the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Lanza v. New York,6 which failed to extend Fourth
Amendment protections to prisons, and examines the reasons
Lanza no longer provides support for precluding incarcerated
persons from entertaining a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their conversations. To achieve these ends this note takes
an historical approach. First, Lanza will be discussed. Sec-
ond, the United States Supreme Court decision of Katz v.
United States7 will be analyzed in terms of its general impact
on the subje'ct of Fourth Amendment protections, and in par-
ticular on Lanza. The post-Katz cases in the federal courts
which extend Fourth Amendment protections to inmates in
non-eavesdropping situations 8 are beyond the scope of this
note, which deals exclusively with the extension of these pro-
tections to prisoner conversations.
Third, the note will discuss the California Supreme Court de-
cision in North v. Superior Court,9 which held that the monitor-
ing of an arrestee's conversation with his wife violated the
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.10 The narrow
holding of the decision will be emphasized, along with its im-
pact on the law of custodial eavesdropping. Finally, this note
will analyze the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate
District decision in Robinson v. Superior Court1 and demon-
strate its importance as a significant departure in the law of
electronic eavesdropping in custodial situations. Special atten-
tion will be given to the court's reliance on Justice Harlan's
5. This note does not deal with electronic surveillance where an agent conceals
the device on his person. This does not "so seriously intrude upon the right of pri-
vacy." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The
risk of being ... betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with
whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society." Id.; See e.g.,
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wire-,
tapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Partici-
pant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1968).
6. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
7. 489 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. E.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 545
F.2d 565 (1976); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 932 (1974); Burns v. Wilkinson, 333 F. Supp. 94 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Palmigiano v..
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
9. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
10. Id. at 312, 502 P.2d at 1312, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 840.




reasonable expectation of privacy test 12 and on the marital
privilege. 3
Robinson v. Superior Court14 has been granted a hearing and
is pending as of this writing, before the California Supreme
Court.' 5 This note argues that, aside from that portion of the
opinion which limits the extension of the Fourth Amendment
protections to spouses, the appellate court decision represents
sound legal reasoning which should be upheld by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.
Since the Fourth Amendment does not preclude all govern-
mental searches,'6 but only those that are unreasonable, 7 this
note will point out problems and prospects in determining the
reasonableness of a challenged search in prison. Although this
note recognizes that privacy rights' 8 may have to be compro-
mised to the extent penal interests are served, it also recog-
nizes that effective law enforcement cannot be held absolutely
sacrosanct at the expense of individual privacy interests.
II
Lanza v. New York: There Is No Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in Prison
In Lanza v. New York,' 9 petitioner visited his brother, who
12. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See
text accompanying notes 52-56 & 134-137, infra.
13. CAL. EVID. CODE § 917 (West 1980) provides that:
Whenever a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be
disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of the ... hus-
band-wife relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in
confidence and the opponent of the claim has the burden of proof to establish
that the communication was not confidential.
14. 105 Cal. App. 3d 249, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1980), hearing granted, No. S.F. 24185,
June 25, 1980.
15. A hearing was granted by the California Supreme Court on June 25, 1980, but a
hearing date has not been set. Although this note refers to the opinion published by
the appellate court, this opinion cannot be cited as law. The granting of a hearing auto-
matically vacates the opinion of the Court of Appeal. CAL. R. CT. 976(d); Bloom v.
Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 74 n.2, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1976).
16. A Fourth Amendment search is one that intrudes upon a person's security
from governmental intrusion. See Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133, 134.
17. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
18. For a general discussion of privacy rights in prison see Singer, Privacy, Auton-
omy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional As-
pects of the Degradation Process in Our Prisons, 21 BuFF. L REV. 669 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Singer].
19. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
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was then incarcerated in a New York jail. The conversation, in
which his brother confessed to a crime, was intercepted while
the two conversed in a prison visiting room. Neither had
knowledge of the electronic listening device installed in the
room by state officials.2"
Lanza was convicted of violating a New York statute by will-
fully refusing to answer questions put to him by a legislative
committee after he had been given immunity from prosecu-
tion. The transcript of Lanza's monitored conversation with
his brother formed the basis for the questions which Lanza re-
fused to answer.2'
The question of whether or not electronic surveillance of a
prisoner constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure arose
as part of Lanza's argument that his conviction violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The
United States Supreme Court decided it was unnecessary to
reach the search and seizure issue because at least two issues
did not arise from information resulting from the surveil-
lance.23 Nevertheless, the Court, in a plurality opinion,24 stated
that a jail was not a "protected area" immunized by the Fourth
Amendment against an unreasonable search and seizure.25
Therefore, electronic eavesdropping of the petitioner's conver-
sation with his brother was not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.
In language that has been constantly quoted,26 the United
States Supreme Court stated:
But to say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's
"house" or that it is a place where he can claim constitutional
immunity from search or seizure of his person, his papers, or
his effects, is at best a novel argument ..... [Ilt is obvious
that a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an
automobile, an office, or a hotel room. In prison, official surveil-
20. Id. at 141.
21. Id. at 141.
22. Id. at 141.
23. Id. at 145.
24. Id.; see also Singer, supra note 18, at 673.
25. Id. at 143.
26. E.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973); Konigs-
berg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585, 599 n.7 (W.D. Mo. 1968); People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App.
3d 476, 481, 85 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296 (1970); State v. Fischer, 270 N.W. 345, 351-52 (N.D. 1978);
Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 343, 467 P.2d 50, 52 (1970); State v. Peitraszewski, 285
Minn. 212, 219, 172 N.W.2d 758, 764 (1969).
[Vol. 4
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lance has traditionally been the order of the day.27
Three members of the Court--Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tices Brennan and Douglas-in a concurring opinion-objected
to what they considered to be unnecessary comments in the
Court opinion pertaining to constitutional protections against
invasion of privacy inside a jail.28
Perhaps Chief Justice Warren foresaw the possible reliance
on this dicta, for he stated that "[s] uch dicta, when written into
our decisions, have an unfortunate way of turning up in digests
and decisions of lower courts; they are often quoted as evi-
dencing the considered opinion of this Court, and this is so
even though such intention is denied by the writer.
29
Chief Justice Warren's statement proved to be extremely in-
sightful, as the constitutionality of prison surveillance has
been predicated on the assumption that a jail is not a constitu-
tionally-protected area.3 ° Continued reliance on Lanza for this
contention is suspect for many reasons. First, there was no
majority opinion. Only seven Justices took part in the case,3'
and the contention that a prison is not a constitutionally pro-
tected area was only dicta.32 Second, although the United
States Supreme Court has not decided that Fourth Amend-
ment protections apply to prisons,33 the Court has stated that a
prisoner retains some constitutional protections.3 4 The Court
stated: "[b]ut though [a prisoner's] rights may be diminished
by needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections
when he is imprisoned for a crime. There is no iron curtain
27. 370 U.S. at 143 (1962) (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 150-52.
29. Id. at 148.
30. See Boven, Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State Legislative
Control, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1182, 1202 (1969).
31. 370 U.S. at 147 (1962).
32. Thus, due to the doctrine of obiter dictum, Lanza does not, as many cases
claim, provide strong support for the proposition that it is well settled that there is no
right of privacy in a jail, or that there are no Fourth Amendment barriers to surveil-
lance of inmates by prison authorities. See Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and
Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amendment out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L.
REV. 1045, 1056 (1976), [hereinafter cited as Giannelli & Gilligan]; 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 416-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as LAFAvE]; Singer, supra note 18, at 673; Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311,1316-17 (7th
Cir. 1975). But see, United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1345 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977).
33. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979).
34. See, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
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drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this coun-
try."' 35 Finally, the protected area concept36 upon which Lanza
relied, no longer retains validity. 7
Nevertheless, when it has been suggested that evidence ob-
tained by prison surveillance was improperly admitted on the
theory that its procurement was an unconstitutional invasion
of the prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights, courts have con-
sistently upheld the admissibility of the evidence, arguing that
Lanza held that a jail is not a constitutionally-protected area
and therefore incarcerated persons cannot reasonably enter-
tain an expectation of privacy.
38
III
The Demise of the Protected Area Concept-
Does Lanza Remain Applicable To
Electronic Surveillance Cases?
The doctrinal underpinning of Lanza v. New York, 39 and
other cases relying on its constitutionally-protected area con-
cept,4 ° was eroded by the 1967 decision of Katz v. United
States.4 Courts throughout the nation, however, have contin-
ued to adhere to the protected-area concept in decisions in-
volving prison communications. In Katz, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the trespass approach to electronic
surveillance espoused in Olmstead v. United States42 and
Goldman v. United States43 and relied upon in Lanza. Under
Olmstead, the admissibility of evidence turned on whether
there was any physical trespass, however slight, against the
35. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
36. See, Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 32, at 1057-58.
37. See text accompanying notes 39-51, supra.
38. See cases cited at note 2, supra.
39. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
40. See Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 32, at 1057-58.
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Singer, supra note 18, at 674-75.
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruling Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Olin-
stead was a wiretapping case in which it was held that the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment was limited to the seizure of tangibles and therefore did not pertain to the
seizure of conversations. The Court further observed that no trespass had taken place,
which it indicated was necessary to invoke the Fourth Amendment. The wiretap had
been placed on the telephone wires outside of the defendant's house.
43. 316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruling Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In
Goldman, the Court held that a microphone placed against the wall of a private office




defendant's premises." The Katz Court held that the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment hinged upon the expecta-
tion of privacy rather than upon invasion of rights associated
with property.
45
In Katz, the formal demise of the constitutionally-protected
area analysis occurred with the proposition that "the fourth
amendment protects people, not places. '4 6 Justice Stewart, in
writing the majority opinion, concluded: "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection [whereas]
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
'47
Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information by
telephone in violation of a federal statute. Without a warrant,
FBI agents had attached a listening device to the outside of a
public telephone booth, enabling them to record Katz's conver-
sation. Overruling Olmstead and Goldman, the Court held
that the FBI's conduct violated Katz's expectation of privacy,48
and therefore evidence of Katz's conversation had to be sup-
pressed.49 The Court held that electronic monitoring of a tele-
phone booth, even absent a physical intrusion into the booth,
44. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 466 (1928).
45. The Court rejected the traditional notion that only private property could be
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
46. 389 U.S. at 351 (1967). See Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 133; Amsterdam, Perspectives on The Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 377-409 (1974).
47. Id. at 351-52.
48. Id. at 353.
49. The exclusionary rule makes evidence inadmissible in court if law enforce-
ment officers obtained it by means forbidden by the Constitution, by statute or by
court rules. Dictum in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), first suggested that
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be inadmissible in
court. It was not until thirty years later that this suggestion became law in the federal
courts in 1914 in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In 1949 the Fourth Amend-
ment right to immunity from unreasonable search and seizure was recognized as ap-
plicable to state as well as to federal action in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). But
the Court did not impose the exclusionary rule as a required method of enforcement
until 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court held that the failure to ex-
clude evidence that state officers had obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure
violated the defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
For debate over the viability of the exclusionary rule, see Kamisar, Is the Exclusion-
ary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment? 62
JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?
62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule
as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974).
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was nevertheless a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 0 The Court rejected the contention that a physi-
cal trespass was required and abandoned the idea that the
Fourth Amendment's protection applied only in certain consti-
tutionally-protected areas.
51
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz is the definitive
test for determining whether a person has a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy."52 Justice Harlan asserted that "there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' ,51 The distinction between the two requirements
has been blurred over time.54 Harlan's more recent interpreta-
tion of his test,55 where he repudiates the misplaced reliance
on the subjective measure of his test, will be discussed later in
this note,56 along with the Robinson court's application of the
test. State and federal courts since Katz have generally used
Harlan's "reasonable expectation of privacy" formulation in
non-custodial situations to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment requires law enforcement agents to obtain a war-
rant prior to conducting a search.5 7 But this test has rarely
been applied in custodial situations since most courts have
stated that the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply.
51
An increasing number of courts have held that incarcerated
persons retain some Fourth Amendment protections. 9 How-
ever, this notion of some Fourth Amendment protection has
not been extended to eavesdropping cases. Professor Wayne
LaFave has noted:
With the emergence in the non-eavesdropping cases of the no-
tion "that a prisoner enjoys the protection of the Fourth
50. 389 U.S. at 353 (1967).
51. Id.
52. For a good example of the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy
test see Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. See Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 384.
55. Harlan repudiated the purely subjective interpretation of the second prong of
the reasonable expectation of privacy test in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. See text accompanying notes 134-137, infra.
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). But see Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289-1345
(1981).
58. See cases cited at note 2, supra.
59. See cases cited at note 8, supra.
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Amendment against unreasonable searches, at least to some
minimal extent," it is to be doubted whether the cases concern-
ing eavesdropping upon visitor-prisoner conversation can con-
tinue to be summarily dismissed upon the notion that there is
no privacy in jail.6 °
Professor LaFave also pointed out that:
[Tihe decisions upholding eavesdropping upon prisoner-pris-
oner conversations may be more vulnerable that [sic] those
permitting the monitoring of prisoner-visitor conversations.
This is because monitoring of prisoner conversations . . . is
justified only to the extent "reasonably necessary in order to
maintain jail security." That objective quite clearly was not the
purpose in virtually all of the decided prisoner-prisoner eaves-
dropping cases.61
Prior to Katz, Fourth Amendment decisions on electronic
surveillance of inmates relied on Olmstead62 and the constitu-
tionally-protected area theory. People v. Morgan,6 3 a California
appellate case, is illustrative. The prisoner had spoken to his
sister over a telephone connection built into a glass partition in
the visitors' room. The court cited Olmstead in ruling that the
interception of the conversation was not a search or seizure.
64
The court explained that evidence could not be excluded on
grounds that the prisoner's privacy was unlawfully invaded
since a man detained in jail cannot reasonably expect to enjoy
the privacy afforded to a person in free society.6 5 The court
stated:
His lack of privacy is a necessary adjunct to his imprison-
ment .... To censor and in certain circumstances to forbid
communication to and from a prison is inherent in its adminis-
tration. Such authority is necessary to protect against escape
... Officials in charge of prisoners awaiting trial may ...
under certain circumstances forbid communications between
... certain classes of visitors.
66
60. LaFave, supra note 32, at 417 (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1317
(7th Cir. 1975)).
61. Id. at 420 (quoting North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 502
P.2d 1305 (1972)).
62. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
63. 197 Cal. App. 2d 90, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962).
64. The court cited Olmstead for the proposition that electronic eavesdropping
conducted without physical trespass is not an illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Since in Morgan there was no trespass, the court ruled there was
no illegal search or seizure.
65. Id. at 92, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
66. Id. at 93, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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Although Katz overruled Olmstead, courts have continued to
rely on Olmstead's progeny, Morgan and Lanza, to uphold
monitoring of inmates.6 7 Several courts after Katz have indi-
cated that, in terms of protected areas the usual Fourth
Amendment protections do not apply in a penal institution.68
Likewise, in United States v. Kelley 69 a United States District
Court stated that "prisons ... have been held not to be within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment .... ,70 Neverthe-
less, the abandonment of the "constitutionally-protected area"
concept in Katz leaves the status of prison surveillance in
doubt, as its constitutionality had been predicated on the as-
sumption that a jail was not a constitutionally-protected area.71
IV
North v. Superior Court: The Beginning
Prior to Robinson, North v. Superior Court72 was the only,
California case in which a confined person prevailed in sup..
pressing a monitored conversation using a Katz reasonable ex-.
pectation of privacy argument. There, the California Supreme
Court ruled that the monitoring of an arrestee's conversation
with his wife in a detective's office violated the defendant's rea..
sonable expectation of privacy.73 In North, the police detective
allowed the defendant and his wife to use his private office to
speak to one another.74 He then closed the door and left them
alone.75 Nothing in the detective's actions indicated that the
defendant's conversation with his wife would be monitored
and recorded.76 Although the court recognized that an inmate
could have a reasonable expectation of privacy while in cus-
tody,77 the court limited the scope of its decision by basing it on
the protected status of marital communications, 78 coupled with
67. E.g., North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 309, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837, 502 P.2d
1305, 1309 (1972); People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App. 3d 476, 481, 85 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296 (1970);
People v. Blehm, 623 P.2d 411, 416 (1980), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1981).
68. See cases cited at note 2, supra.
69. 393 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
70. Id. at 756-57.
71. Contra United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1345 (9th Cir. 1977).
72. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
73. Id. at 312, 502 P.2d at 1312, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
74. Id. at 311, 502 P.2d at 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 312, 502 P.2d at 1312, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
78. CAL. EVID. CODE § 917 (West 1980). Courts have made an exception to the rule
[Vol. 4
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the fact that the prisoner was lulled into believing that his con-
versation would be confidential.79 The court did not reject the
general rule that an ordinary jailhouse conversation between
spouses could not be deemed to have been made in confidence.
Rather, the court held that North presented a special situation
in which the conversation occurred under circumstances
strongly indicating that the prisoner entertained a reasonable,
subjective expectation of privacy.8" The court pointed out that:
"nothing in our opinion should be deemed a disapproval of the
common practice of monitoring inmates' conversations with
others, including their spouses, in visiting rooms or similar




The Aftermath of North
North has not had much impact on the status of electronic
surveillance in prisons because the court emphasized that its
decision was directed toward the conduct of the detective82 and
expressly noted that it did not disapprove of inmate monitor-
ing.83 Although many defendants have argued that North pro-
vides support for the suppression of evidence of their marital
conversations,84 the courts have required affirmative action on
the part of law enforcement agents before applying North.85 A
North Dakota Supreme Court decision is illustrative. 6 The
that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations'while in prison
in limited circumstances involving special relationships, such as those between a per-
son in custody and his attorney, religious advisor or physician. See 8 J. WIGMORE, WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2290-91, 2380a, 2396. The relationship between a person in
custody and his spouse has not been found to constitute such a special relationship.
79. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 312, 502 P.2d 1305, 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (1972). Although the
record does not disclose whether or not the detective made any representations that
the ensuing conversation would be confidential, "his admitted conduct spoke as clearly
as words-first by surrendering to petitioner and his wife [his] own private office so
that they might converse and then by exiting and shutting the door, leaving them en-
tirely alone."
80. Id.
81. Id. at 312, 502 P.2d at 1311-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40.
82. See note 79, supra.
83. 8 Cal. 3d at 312, 502 P.2d at 1311-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40 (1972).
84. People v. Jardine, 116 Cal. App. 3d 907, 172 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1981); People v. Hill,
12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974); State v. Fischer, 270 N.W.2d 345 (N.D.
1978).
85. Id.
86. State v. Fischer, 270 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1978).
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court stated:
"As with most jailhouse conversations, we adopt the view that
parties to a jailhouse conversation usually have no reasonable
expectation of privacy ... In some rare cases, a party to a jail-
house conversation may be given an expectation of privacy due
to the deceptive actions of law enforcement personnel. In the
present case, however, neither Jailer Parsons nor anyone else
made any representations to the [defendant and his spouse]
that their conversation would be private.87
Although the defendant was the only prisoner being held on
the second floor cell block,8 8 the court held that he had no rea..
son to believe that his telephone calls would not be moni-
tored.89 Thus, while the court attempts to apply the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, it actually reverts to the protected[
area analysis by declining to examine the facts and by stating
that "[p]rivacy in jail is not an expectation considered to be
reasonable by society".90
VI
Robinson P. Superior Court: The Extension of
Fourth Amendment Protections to
Custodial Settings
The disapproval of the practice of monitoring a suspect's
conversation came seven-and-one-half years after North in
Robinson v. Superior Court,91 when a California appellate
court held that the practice of monitoring a conversation be-
tween a husband and wife violated rights arising under the
constitutions of the United States and California.92
87. Id. at 354.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 352.
91. 105 Cal. App. 3d 249, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1980). This decision was rendered in the
Third District of California. The case has been granted a hearing in the California
Supreme Court. See note 11, supra.
92. Id. at 261, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 396. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, CAL CONST. art. I, § 13.
The Court of Appeal does not rely on the California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. P:-
NAL CODE §§ 630-637.3 (West 1980), or the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968). The question of the applicability of the Privacy
Amendment to the electronic surveillance of conversations between pretrial detainees
and their visitors is currently before the California Supreme Court. De Lancie v. Supe-




A. The Facts in Robinson
James and Jodean Robinson were arrested on March 13, 1979
for burlary 3 and booked into the Sacramento County jail.
Later that same day they were brought to the burglary section
of the Sacramento Police Department. They were placed in
separate, but adjacent, interview rooms for twenty to thirty
minutes. 94 During the time they were separated, they at-
tempted to speak to each other through the common wall while
the police officers surreptitiously, but unsuccessfully, at-
tempted to listen.95 Jodean was then placed in her husband's
room.96 The officers immediately left the room, locked the
door, and activated a hidden recording device.97 The admissi-
bility of the recording of the ensuing conversation was at issue
in the superior court. 8
At the Robinsons' pre-trial hearing on the motion to sup-
press the tape recording of their conversation, the Robinsons
alleged that the tape of their conversation was obtained by the
police through an unlawful search and seizure. They moved to
suppress the tape as evidence pursuant to California Penal
Code section 1538.5 subdivision (a).99 Mrs. Robinson testified
that she believed that the interview room in which she and her
husband had been placed was totally private.100 Moreover,
nothing was visible to indicate that their conversation would
not be private, and she therefore thought that her conversation
with her husband was confidential.'10 In opposing the motion
93. The Robinsons were charged with two counts of burglary, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 459 (West 1980), two counts of receiving stolen property,.CAL. PENAL CODE § 496, and
one count of grand theft, CAL. PENAL CODE § 487(1). See Petitioner's Brief for Hearing
at 3, Robinson v. Superior Court, No. S.F. 24185 (1980).
94. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 252, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (1980). The Robinsons had been
given their Miranda warnings prior to the eavesdropping. The validity of these warn-
ings was not contested.
95. Id.; the police attempted to hear the conversation by ear. Since they could not,
they resorted to an electronic listening device.
96. Respondents claim they were placed together after Mrs. Robinson asked if she
could speak with her husband in private. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for
Hearing, No. S.F. 24185 (1980).
97. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 252, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (1980).
98. Id.; see note 49, supra.
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a) (West 1980) provides in part, that:
"A defendant may move... to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangi-
ble thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on ... the following
grounds:
(1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable."




to suppress, one of the burglary detail officers testified that
neither Mr. nor Mrs. Robinson inquired whether they could
have a private conversation. 10 2 However, the officer also admit-
ted that the Robinsons had not been informed that the room
contained an eavesdropping device. °3 He explained that it,
was common practice to place suspects together and record
their conversations in order to obtain evidence.0 4 The trial
court denied the Robinsons' motion to suppress the tape
recording.
1 0 5
B. The Robinson Decision
The court of appeal issued a writ of mandate pursuant to Cal-.
ifornia Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (i), 10 directing
the trial court to suppress the recording of the conversation.
The court found that there was no rationale upon which the
diminution of the suspects' privacy could be justified. 0 7 There..
fore, the court held that the monitoring and recording of the
conversation without a warrant was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and arti-
cle I, section 13, of the California Constitution.108
The Robinson court did not base its decision on the fact that
the Robinsons may have been lulled into believing their con-
versation would be private. 0 9 The court's point, not discussed
in North, was that a husband and wife have a qualified right to
privacy while in custody. 10 The court stated that the diminu-
tion of their right to communicate privately can take place only
if the government can justify the diminution."' The court fur-
ther stated that if no custodial or penological objective is




106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(i) (West 1980). Section 1538.5(i) provides that the
defendant shall have the right to litigate the validity of a search or seizure de novo on
the basis of the evidence presented at a special hearing. Any review thereafter, prior
to the trial, shall be by means of an extraordinary writ of mandate or prohibition filed
within thirty days after the denial of his motion at the special hearing.
107. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 260, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (1980).
108. Id. at 261, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
109. The court in North v. Superior Court based its decision on the detective's delib-
erate attempt to create an expectation of privacy. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 833 (1972).
110. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (1980).
111. Id.
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served, then the diminution of the right is not justified." 2
VII
The Marital Privilege-What Is Its Relevance?
The Robinson court stated that "[tlhis case puts in issue a
fundamental privacy value: the confidence of a marital com-
munication.""' 3 Although the appellate court based its deci-
sion in part on the fact that the conversation occurred between
spouses, the court did not discuss the importance of that fact.
However, the marital privilege need not be relied upon by the
California Supreme Court when they hear this case, to find
that the Robinsons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their conversation." 4 Rather, the court can rely on the reason-
ably expectation of privacy test, which is a built-in component
of the marital privilege.
Courts recognize various privileges to foster or safeguard
certain relationships or interests which are considered so im-
portant that their protection justifies the exclusion of facts
from evidence."' One such privilege is the marital privilege,"'
which may be claimed to exclude testimony which would re-
veal a confidential communication between spouses. 17 It is
designed to foster free communication in marriages.
1 8
112. Id.
113. Id. at 258, Cal. Rptr. at 394.
114. Although Justice Sullivan, in his dissenting opinion in North v. Superior Court,
argued against finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, he
did point out: "[t] hat the recordings were of the prisoner's conversation with his wife,
rather than with another relative or a friend, is therefore of no moment. The sole ques-
tion we must face is whether, on the facts before us, the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy." 8 Cal. 3d at 318, 502 P.2d at 1313-16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 841-44
(1972), (Sullivan, J., dissenting). For criticism on the reliance of the marital privilege
in North, see Note, Privacy of Communications Between Prisoner and Spouse, 61 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 457, 465 (1973).
115. See 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE at §§ 2290-91 (lawyer-client), 2332
(husband-wife), 2380a (physician-patient), 2396 (priest-penitent).
116. In California there are two marital privileges, the testimony privilege, CAL.
EViD. CODE § 970 (West 1980), and the communications privilege, CAL. EV. CODE § 980
(West 1980). The Robinson court relies on the communications privilege which, unlike
the testimony privilege is a creation of statute. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAw § 2333, at 644; McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 78,
at 161-62 (2d ed. 1972). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(10(a) (1973); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1973); KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-428 (Vernon
1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 6-6(A) (1978); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAw § 4502(b) (McKinney
1963); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(D) (Page 1981).
117. Id.
118. See Comment, The Husband- Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, The
COMM/ENT
For a marital conversation to be privileged, the communica-
tion must be confidential." 9 Marital communications are pre-
sumed confidential, 120  albeit a presumption that can be
rebutted upon a showing that the parties realized their conver-
sation was being overheard,' 2 1 or that the communication was
made under any other circumstances which would preclude a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality. 2 2 Courts have thus
held that the presumption of confidentiality is rebutted when
the conversation takes place in a custodial setting.
123
Therefore, before a court can conclude that the marital privi..
lege applies, the court must determine that it was reasonable
for the prisoner to consider his conversation to be private. By
finding the expectation of privacy to be reasonable, the court
invokes the protection of the Fourth Amendment against un.-
reasonable searches and seizures. 12  Therefore, if the Fourth
Amendment applies, it is not necessary to invoke the protec-
tion afforded by the marital privilege. It may be argued that
the California Supreme Court should not decide the constitu-
tional question because the court can rest its decision on the
grounds of marital privilege. 2  But it is necessary to decide
the constitutional question in this case because the marital
privilege provides only inadequate protection to the Robin-
sons' communications. 26 In California, the marital privilege
Privilege for Confidential Communications, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208, 218-19 (1961); CA_
EvmD. CODE § 980, Law Rev. Comm'n. comment (West 1981).
119. See authorities cited at note 116, supra.
120. See, e.g., CAL. EvD. CODE § 917 (West 1982); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332,
333 (1951); Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1053 (1972); People v. Santos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 397, 102 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1972); People v.
Califano, 5 Cal. App. 3d 476, 85 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1970); People v. Palumbo, 5 111. 2d 409, 125
N.E.2d 518 (1955); People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1951).
122. See, e.g., People v. Worthington, 38 Cal. App. 3d 359, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1974);
Smith v. State, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803 (1926); Sheldon v. Sheldon, 146 App. Div. 430,
131 N.Y.S. 291 (1911); Millspaugh v. Potter, 62 App. Div. 521, 71 N.Y.S. 134 (1901).
123. See cases cited at note 2, supra.
124. The application of the Fourth Amendment has consistently depended on dem-
onstration of a "legitimate," "reasonable," or "justifiable" expectation of privacy. See
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
125. "It is a well-established principle that [the Court] will not decide constitu-
tional questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues of the
case." Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30 n.6 (1948); Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 3.2
Cal. 2d 53, 65 (1948).
126. See Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
'Law and Order", 67 McH. L. REv. 455, 466-68 (1969), for the view that eavesdropping
on privileged communications should be forbidden.
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only prevents the eavesdropper from testifying in legal pro-
ceedings. 127 Reliance on the marital privilege would not pro-
hibit use of the conversation for investigative purposes.
128
Whether the California Supreme Court's forthcoming deci-
sion in Robinson will have an impact on the protections af-
forded all prisoners will depend upon whether the court
chooses to rely on the marital privilege or decide the constitu-
tional issue. If the court holds that the Robinsons' Fourth
Amendment rights were violated, its decision will be of signifi-
cant precedential value. It will stand for the proposition that
cases involving eavesdropping upon prisoners' conversations
should not "be summarily dismissed upon the notion that
there is no privacy in jail,"'1 29 but should be examined to deter-
mine if the prisoner's expectation of privacy was reasonable.
VIII
When Is an Expectation of Privacy Reasonable?
The Robinson court applied Harlan's reasonable expectation
of privacy test to determine that the Robinsons' expectations
were constitutionally justifiable so as to implicate the Fourth
Amendment. 3 ' But the court pointed-out that there has been
a misplaced reliance upon the subjective component of
Harlan's two-prong test.' 3 1 According to the Robinson court,
the subjective expectation of privacy is not meant to refer to
the claimant's personal expectation, 32 rather it is dependent
127. See CAL EvD. CODE §§ 901, 910 (West 1982).
128. Besides limiting the protections of the Fourth Amendment to spouses, a hold-
ing that relies on the marital privilege would have no persuasive effect on states where
the husband-wife privilege does not allow a spouse to invoke the privilege against a
third-party eavesdropper. See People v. Blehm, - Colo. App. -, 623 P.2d 411,
417 (1980), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1981), which held that the marital privilege
"prohibits only the husband or the wife from testifying." Id. The court held that it was
permissible for the agent who monitored the conversation to testify. Id. Robinson
would also be of no persuasive value to states that do not recognize a husband-wife
privilege.
129. See text accompanying notes 60-61, supra.
130. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 255-59, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 392-94 (1980).
131. Id. at 255-58, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 392-94. This subjective expectation of privacy
prong has often been criticized. See Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 384; Note, Katz and
the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home is His
Fort, 23 CLEv. ST. L REV. 63 (1974); Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 32, at 1060-61:
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kim, 415 F.
Supp. 1252, 1256-67 (D. Hawaii 1976); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 788 (W.D.
Mich. 1975); United States v. Carroll, 337 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (D.D.C. 1971).
132. Id. at 256, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
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upon the degree of privacy our society will recognize. 133 Jus-
tice Harlan repudiated the purely subjective interpretation of
his test in his dissenting opinion in United States v. White.3
Justice Harlan stated that "[t]he analysis must, in my view,
transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attri-
bution of assumptions of risk."'35 He felt that: "we should not,
as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without ex-.
amining the desirability of saddling them upon society.' 1 36 Ac-
cording to Justice Harlan, "[t Ihe critical question, therefore, is
whether under our system of government, as reflected in the
Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risks of the
electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of
a warrant requirement."'
137
Justice Stevens made this same point in his dissenting opin.-
ion in Bell v. Wolfish.138 He stated that a "'reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy' cannot have this purely subjective connotation
lest we wake up one day to headlines announcing that hence-
forth the Government will not recognize the sanctity of the
home but will instead enter residences at will."' 3 9 Justice Ste-
vens felt that "[t]he reasonableness of the expectation must
include an objective component that refers to those aspects of
human activity that the 'reasonable person' typically expects
will be protected from unchecked Government observation."'4 °
As one writer pointed out, "[a]n actual, subjective expecta-
tion of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what
Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment pro-
133. Id.; see also Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment
Legitimacy Through State Law, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1981).
134. 401 U.S. at 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. Id.; but see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). With Harlan no longer
on the Court the purely subjective expectation prong of his test appears to be resur-
rected. Chadwick involved a warrantless seizure and search of a double-locked foot-
locker incident to an arrest. In affirming the suppression of the evidence, the court
reasoned:
In this case, important Fourth Amendment privacy interests were at stake. By
placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents mani-
fested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public exami-
nation. No less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders,
one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.
Id. at 11.
136. 401 U.S. at 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. 441 U.S. 520, 579 (1979).




tects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from,
an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection.'
14 1
Otherwise, correctional officials might greatly restrict the
scope of an inmate's Fourth Amendment rights by announcing
a policy of continued surveillance. 1' 2
The Robinson court also agreed that the subjective prong of
Harlan's test cannot have a purely subjective connotation.
43
According to Robinson, under some circumstances a prisoner
may be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections even with-
out a subjective expectation of privacy. 14 But courts have held
that the lack of a subjective expectation of privacy precludes
Fourth Amendment protections in prison."' The case of Peo-
ple v. Santos"'6 is illustrative. In Santos, the California
Supreme Court held that when a prisoner and his spouse
feared their conversations in a police department visiting room
might be monitored and recorded, the prisoner could not claim
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his marital communica-
tion.147 The prisoner testified that he did not know the inter-
com system was being monitored, but that he had only heard
from other prisoners that the police sometimes monitored con-
versations. The court cited his suspicion as evidence that he
failed to entertain a reasonable expectation of privacy.'48 The
court did state that the Supreme Court might wish to reassess
the rule when jail inmates show a strong claim to privacy.1
4 9
However, defendant and his wife could not show a strong claim
to privacy since they were aware their conversation might be
overheard but chose to speak anyway. Therefore, the court
141. Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 384.
142. Id.; according to one scholar, "[tihe proposition that a prisoner has less pri-
vacy ... in jail, and therefore he has no reasonable expectation of privacy is one of the
most outrageous examples of tautological thinking espoused in many years." Singer,
supra note 18, at 678 n.26. The writer went on to say:
Surely the Katz case cannot be so easily evaded; surely it means that wher-
ever one would reasonably expect privacy, he must be accorded privacy there,
and cannot be deprived of that reasonable desire for privacy simply because
he is told that it is not private. That is to say, there is some privacy the police
cannot take away, at least without a warrant, no matter how explicit the notice
of non-privacy.
Id. at 679 n.26.
143. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 258, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (1980).
144. Id. at 255-56, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
145. See cases cited at note 121, supra.
146. 26 Cal. App. 3d 397, 102 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1972).
147. Id. at 400, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
148. Id. at 403, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
149. Id. at 402, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
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held that Fourth Amendment protections would not apply be-.
cause the couple did not meet the subjective expectation of pri-
vacy requirement of the reasonable expectation of privacy
test.1
5 0
But Katz does not mean that Fourth Amendment protec-
tions do not apply once a person is given advance notice of an
intended surveillance.' 5 ' According to Robinson, the question
becomes whether a free society can afford to give its police un-
limited authority to intrude electronically by monitoring pri-
vate conversations in a custodial setting. This requires an
assessment of whether the monitoring of such conversations
serves some penological interest.
Ix
Problems and Prospects
The Fourth Amendment does not preclude all governmental
searches; it precludes only those that are "unreasonable" and
therefore 152 does not preclude searches which the government
can justify. The appellate court in Robinson recognized that
there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy between
spouses while they are in custody which can be invaded only
when the government can demonstrate that a compelling inter-
est justified that invasion. 5 3 But Robinson also recognized
that a court may hold that a challenged surveillance of a con-
fined person is not within the protective ambit of the Fourth
Amendment because the search is justifiable, and thus reason-
able.1M The Robinson court did not set forth strict standards
for determining the limitations on an incarcerated person's
reasonable expectation of privacy in his communications, nor
did it provide the legal community, law enforcement officials or
150. Id. at 403, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 681. See also People v. Estrada, 93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 99,
155 Cal. Rptr. 731, 746 (1979). The defendant was visited by his sister while he was in
jail and spoke to her in a combination of English, Spanish, and Pig-Latin-Spanish dia-
lects which they did not commonly speak. The court found that this indicated that the
defendant felt that others could easily have overheard them and therefore, he did not
intend that his conversations would be private.
151. LaFave, supra note 32, at 417-18. See also Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 384;
Robinson v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 3d 249, 256, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389, 393 (1980)
(quoting Amsterdam).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
153. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 258, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (1980). The court went on to say
that this invasion may occur only to the extent made necessary by that interest. Id. at
259, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
154. Id. at 260, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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the prisoner with any guidance as to what governmental inter-
ests may justify an intrusion upon a prisoner's right to privacy
in his communications. 155 However, the court did focus on how
one must view governmental interests in relation to the pri-
vacy rights at stake in analyzing the significance of the role
played by governmental interests. 15 6 The court found that the
validity of diminishing a basic privacy right depends solely
upon the government's justification for the intrusion.15 7 Hence,
the government may deprive a prisoner of a basic right when
this is reasonably necessary for the security of the custodial
institution in which the prisoner is confined. 5 8 A balancing
test may be used to determine when a government interest will
justify'59 a diminution of a prisoner's right to privacy in his
communications.16
0
155. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). "But though [a prisoner's]
rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environ-
ment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is impris-
oned for [a] crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country."
156. 105 Cal. App. 3d 249, 260, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 (1980).
157. Id.
158. Justice Rehnquist, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), emphasized that the
need to maintain security and to preserve discipline in a prison outweighs allowing
prisoners to retain many of the rights that a person would normally retain had he not
been incarcerated. But he added, "[t] hough subject to the physical restraint on liberty
incident to confinement, the detained citizen does not automatically forfeit his basic
civil rights as soon as the jailhouse door clangs shut." Id. at 581.
159. The Robinson court first states that any limitation on privacy must be justified
by compelling government interests. 105 Cal. App. 3d 249, 258, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389, 394
(1980). The court later states that the policy of California Penal Code section 2600 is
applicable to the Robinson case, even though the monitoring did not occur in a prison.
Section 2600 provides that a prisoner may be deprived of rights if they are necessary to
provide for the reasonable security of the institution. The natural conclusion then is
that the reasonable security of the institution is a compelling governmental interest.
The court does not delve into the meaning of reasonable security. Can it be argued
that there is always the compelling interest of security present? See cases cited at
note 174, infra. Would it be enough to show that the monitoring was reasonably re-
lated to security? Or should there be a requirement that there be a clear and present
danger of a breach of prison security?
160. The courts often use a balancing test when dealing with constitutional rights.
However, the balancing test is inappropriate where nonfundamental rights are at
stake. Balancing is designed to resolve the conflict between the nature of the prison as
an institution and the strict scrutiny test generally applied in cases involving funda-
mental rights. Balancing is undertaken after it is concluded that there has been a
search or seizure. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 20-21 (1968). Balancing helps determine whether a search or
seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but it does not bear on the rea-
sonableness of expectations of privacy.
COMM/ENT
A. A Balancing of Interests
A balancing of interests test provides a suitable method for
determining if the eavesdropping on the Robinsons was justi-
fled. "When the claim is that a prison regulation infringes
upon a constitutional right, 'a court must balance the asserted
need for the regulation in furthering prison security or orderly
administration against the claimed constitutional right and the
degree to which it has been impaired.' "161 The United States
Supreme Court used a balancing test in Bell v. Wolfish 6 2 to
determine whether the contested searches were reasonable
and therefore not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 63 In
Bell, inmates challenged a New York prison regulation requir-
ing inmates to expose their body cavities for visual inspection
after every contact visit with a person from outside the institu-
tion."' The prisoners claimed that their Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated, but the Court concluded that these
searches were reasonable. 65 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court avoided acknowledging that inmates do have privacy
rights, 6 but stated that even if such privacy rights do exist,
such searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
67
In Bell, the governmental interest in maintaining the secur-
ity of the institution was the decisive factor in the balancing
test. 6 8 It weighed against the prisoners' privacy interests and
led the Court to hold the regulation valid.'69
161. Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1972) (quoting Smith v. Robbins,
328 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Me. 1971), affd., 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972)). See also Git-
tlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
162. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
163. Id. at 559.
164. Id. at 558.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 558.
167. Id. The Court pointed out the problem in determining whether the Fourth
Amendment is applicable in a given situation. According to the Court:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balanc-
ing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights
that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intru-
sion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and
the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 359.
168. Id. at 559.
169. Id. at 560. In applying the test, the Court stated:
A detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers.
Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common
an occurrence. And inmate attempts to secrete these items into the facility by
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The Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit in Bonner v.
Coughlin,170 also applied a balancing test to determine the rea-
sonableness of such contested searches. According to the
court,
[r]espect for the dignity of the individual compels a compara-
ble conclusion with respect to his interests in privacy. Unques-
tionably, entry into a controlled environment entails a
dramatic loss of privacy. Moreover, the justifiable reasons for
invading an inmate's privacy are both obvious and easily estab-
lished. We are persuaded, however, that the surrender of pri-
vacy is not total and that some residuum meriting the
protection of the Fourth Amendment survives the transfer into
custody.' 7 '
Both the Bell and Bonner courts apparently viewed balancing
as the appropriate means of reconciling asserted Fourth
Amendment rights with the legitimate policies and goals of the
correctional system. But this test alone is not sufficient. Along
with it goes the theory of the least intrusive means.
72
B. The Least Intrusive Means
The theory of the least intrusive means and the utility of the
balancing test require an enumeration of the many state inter-
ests in incarceration. Four goals of imprisonment are gener-
ally recognized: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and
confinement of the prisoner for the protection of society.
173
Other state interests relate primarily to the practical problems
associated with running a prison, especially the maintenance
of security and order.174 But "the shibboleth of jail security is
not a passport to wholesale abuse of . . . constitutional
concealing them in body cavities are documented in this record . . .and in
other cases.
Id. at 559.
170. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).
171. Id. at 1316.
172. See cases cited at note 176 and 183, infra.
173. Cressey, Adult Felons in Prison, in PRISONERS IN AMERICA (L. Ohlin ed. 1973).
174. Some courts have adopted the position that prison searches are per se reason-
able because of security needs. See Burns v. Wilkinson, 333 F. Supp. 94 (W.D. Mo.
1971); Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970) (en banc); Smith v. State, 1 Md.
App. 297 (1967); State v. Pietraszewski, 285 Minn. 212, 172 N.W. 2d 758 (1969). See
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974), for several governmental interests asso-
ciated with running a prison. See also Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627
(N.D.N.Y. 1969), affd., 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd sub. nom. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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rights.1175 A court must inquire whether the challenged search
actually furthers the interests that the state could achieve by
alternatives less intrusive of constitutional rights. 76
The Robinson court did not find any custodial purpose
served by the electronic surveillance. Nor did it find that the
security of the custodial institution was enhanced in any way
by the warrantless eavesdropping.177 According to Robinson,
"[t]he diminution of privacy may occur only to the extent
made necessary by the interest served .... [I]f the officers
had the slighest concern for security relating to the marital
communication that concern would have been served by not
allowing the defendants to speak at all,"' 78 and certainly, not
by placing the two suspects together in one room. The court
found that "the sole purpose of the eavesdropping was to ob-
tain incriminating evidence.' 79
The government may point out that surveillance has always
been an effective technique for the investigation of a crime.
But, according to Robinson, the need to obtain evidence of a
crime is not enough to justify a diminution in the right of pri-
vacy.180 "Where law enforcement aims are motivating the sur-
175. State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C. 500, 224 S.E.2d 666, (1976).
176. This notion is similar to the doctrine of the "least restrictive alternative."
"When the government has 'reasonable and adequate alternatives available' to a given
end, it must choose the measure which least interferes with individual liberties."
Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1288 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 908 (1974),
modified on remand, 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir. 1974) (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414-19 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring). See also Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable
Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254passim (1964); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONS, § 23-6.1(a) (Approved Draft 1981). Section 23-6.1(a) pro-
vides that "[1limitations on prisoners' communication rights should be the least re-
strictive necessary to serve the legitimate interests of institutional order and security
and protection of the public. According to Professor LaFave, "a seizure is unreasona-
ble when a less intrusive means of securing the permissible objective is readily avail-
able." LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'" The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 160.
177. If there were security interests involved, what would be recognized as less in-
trusive methods? Would television monitoring without sound be any less intrusive?
Would warning inmates of monitoring be sufficient?
178. Although this point arguably only relates to the precise circumstances in
Robinson, may it be said that a prisoner's right to speak with others can be eliminated
altogether because of the necessity for security? The author suggests that the Robin-
son court was merely pointing out that there were less intrusive means to preserve
security in the Robinsons' situation. Robinson, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
179. Id.
180. Id.; contra People v. Owens, 112 Cal. App. 3d 441, 449, 169 Cal. Rptr. 359, 363
(1980), which stated that "in addition to the compelling interest in maintaining jail
security we must consider the public interest in acting on a well-founded suspicion
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veillance, there is no justification for deviating from traditional
fourth amendment protections."'181 Perhaps the courts should
adhere to the American Bar Association proposal that, "[t] he
monitoring of oral communications must rest on reliable infor-
mation that a particular communication may jeopardize the
safety of the public or the safety or security of a correctional
institution, or is being used to further illegal activity."'8 2 Spe-
cifically protected constitutional rights may only be restricted
if the restrictions are justified by a substantial need and
achieved in the least intrusive manner. 83 Therefore, the inva-
sion of the Robinsons' privacy for the purpose of obtaining in-
criminating evidence could not be justified.
Balancing always presents the possibility that the outcome
of a case will depend upon a court's subjective evaluation of
the interests involved. This danger may be limited somewhat
by requiring that judges consider only certain interests and
make their value judgments explicit. The ultimate decision
plainly is a value judgment. If law enforcement surveillance of
inmates is unchecked by constitutional restraints, the amount
of privacy retained by an incarcerated person would be dimin-




The Robinsons' case represents that aspect of electronic sur-
veillance which is repugnant to the principle of the Fourth
Amendment-the government's seizure of a person's private
conversation, not the trespass which might occur in the pro-
cess. Eavesdropping is more intrusive than a physical search
for tangibles because the victim of the eavesdropping is less
likely to become aware of the intrusion. Only in the case
where the eavesdropping yields evidence that is made public
in court proceedings can those whose privacy has been in-
that the detainees would take the opportunity to get their stories straight and that
their conversation would touch on criminal activity."
181. Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 26, at 1088.
182. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONS § 23-6.1(c)
(Approved Draft 1981).
183. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 419 (1974); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971), aff'g. per curiam, Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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vaded learn of the fact. 184 According to the drafters of the Bos-
ton University Center for Criminal Justice, Model Rules and
Regulations on Prisoners' Rights and Responsibilities,
"[ellectronic surveillance is such an intensive invasion of pri-
vacy that persons both inside and out of prisons deserve maxi-
mum protection from their use."' 85
The pervasive, covert practice challenged by the Robinsons
should not survive judicial scrutiny by the California Supreme
Court, and the assertion derived from dicta in Lanza, that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison, should
be expressly abandoned. Rather, a balancing of governmental
interests and those of individual prisoners should be en-
couraged to permit a lower court to assess the merits of a chal-
lenged claim and to reach a result which is warranted by a
particular situation. Courts should not invariably recite that
there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison
without examining the facts and circumstances of each case. If
there is to be "no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution
and the prisons," 8 ' the fact that the search takes place in a
custodial setting should be but one factor to be weighed in de-
termining the reasonableness of the challenged search.
After this note had been sent to the printers, the California
Supreme Court rendered a decision in De Lancie v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 3d 865, - Cal. Rptr. -, - P.2d - (1982). The
court held that pretrial detainees have a cause of action, under
California Penal Code section 2600, against jail officials who
monitor their private conversations with visitors if the moni-
toring is conducted for the purpose of discovering evidence for
use in criminal trials, rather than for security purposes. Ac-
cording to the court,
[t]o deny a right of privacy on the ground that inmates, disa-
bused by prior decisions, have lost their normal expectations of
privacy would defeat the purposes of the statutes. Thus we
cannot, consistently with the policies underlying sections 2600
and 2601, hold as a matter of law that detainees have no reason-
able expectation that their conversations with visitors will be
private, or that monitoring of such conversations never in-
fringes upon such an expectation of privacy. Id. at 876.
184. See Rogers, The Case for Wiretapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 798-801 (1954).
185. BOSTON UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MODEL RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, Rule ID-6 comment (1973).
186. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
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The court did not rule on the Fourth Amendment issue as
the case was decided on statutory grounds.

